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Private Heath Matthews of "C" Company, 1st Battalion, Royal Canadian Regiment, awaits medical attention 
beside the Regimental Aid Post on 22 June 1952 following a night patrol. 
(Photo by P. Tomelin, NAC PA 128850) 
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''Miniature Set-Piece Battles'' 
Infantry Patrolling Operations in 
Korea, May-June 1952 
Christopher Doary 
W ith the exception of an area south of Kaesong, the front line in Korea generally 
lay north of the 38th parallel by April 1952. 
Armistice negotiations had been ongoing since 
the latter half of 1951 and had come to reflect 
the static front that existed as the Korean War 
entered its third year. 
It was in this climate that a directive from 
the Headquarters of 1st US Corps was issued to 
the First Commonwealth Division ( 1 Comwel 
Div) on 18 May 1952. It directed that the 
division's forward battalions were to carry out 
weekly fighting patrols with the aim of capturing 
at least one prisoner every three days. 1 This was 
to prove a frustrating task for the division's 
British and Canadian brigades. 
By the end of June 1952 it was clear that 
this patrolling policy, and the operations that it 
had spawned, had failed. A number of reasons 
could be used to explain why Canadians, in 
particular, were unable to realize the policy's 
objective. For example, there may have been a 
reluctance on the part of some to risk lives in a 
"foreign" war, especially at a time when an 
armistice appeared imminent. But there are 
more compelling arguments for the policy's 
demise. The reason for the general failure of the 
Corps directive rests with the questionable merit 
and unrealistic aims of the policy itself. 
Notwithstanding this, the inability of Canadians 
to overcome the directive's shortcomings can be 
attributed to ineffective patrol planning and 
preparation, and a lack of training, especially in 
infantry patrolling. 
Before a discussion of these arguments can 
be undertaken, it is necessary to locate them 
within the operational situation as it existed in 
May 1952. What follows is an examination of 
the US directive, and thereafter, a detailed study 
of the patrolling operations of the First Battalion, 
The Royal Canadian Regiment ( 1 RCR) in May-
June 1952. The RCRs have been selected as a 
case study based upon their performance within 
the Canadian brigade. They not only conducted 
the most fighting and ambush patrols, but had 
the most enemy contacts and carried out the 
most successful raid during this period. 2 
By the end of April 1952, 1 Comwel Div held 
the "Jamestown" line to the northeast of the 
Sami-ch'on several kilometres northwest of 
where it flows into the Imjin-gang, and some 50 
kilometres north of Seoul. As part of this 
division, the 25th Canadian Infantry Brigade (25 
CIB) was responsible for manning positions on 
the east side of the Sami-ch'on and an unnamed 
tributary that flows into it from the northeast. 
The brigade's left flank was protected by the 1st 
US Marine Division on the west bank, while the 
British 28th Brigade, on the Canadian right, 
marked the right-hand boundary of the 
Commonwealth sector. 3 
During this month, the Active Force 
paratroopers of the first battalions of the RCR 
and the Royal 22nd Regiment ( 1 R22eR), known 
as the "Vandoos," replaced the Special Force 
volunteers of their second battalions in 25 CIB. 
Together with the First Battalion Princess 
Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry ( 1 PPCLI), who 
had rotated earlier in 1951, they set about 
improving their defensive positions in the first 
weeks of May 1952. 
©Canadian Military History, Volume 6, Number L Spring 1997, pp.20-33. 21 
2
Canadian Military History, Vol. 6 [1997], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol6/iss1/3
, 
, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
, 
, 
R.C.R. Dispositions 
"Jamestown" Line: May 22, 1952 
c.::> Canadian Positions 
(~) Chinese Positions 
•• 
The RCRs found themselves sandwiched 
between the Western Canadian Patricias in the 
north and the French Canadians to their south 
(see Map 1 ). They were dug in along two parallel 
ridges that ran east-west. The ridges' western 
ends faced a narrow valley, a mixture of paddy 
fields and old plough land, crossed by dried-up 
ditches. The valley's lower slopes were covered 
with scrub, while the upper slopes revealed stony 
ground exposed by repeated artillery fire and air 
strikes. 4 A track and a stream divided the valley 
along its length. The westem side, manned by 
the Chinese 119 Division, was described by a 
member of'D' Company's 10 platoon: 
The battered but still dangerous features, known 
by their spot heights as Pt 166 and Pt 133, 
glowered at us with their faces scarred by UN 
explosives and Chinese digging. Forward of these 
two hulks is the great amphitheatre of Pt 113 
the ridge ofPt 72 and the lump ofPt 75.5 
The difficult terrain and the Chinese positions, 
interlaced with numerous trenches, bunkers, 
and tunnels, the latter dug through rock and 
almost impervious to bombardment, presented 
the RCRs with many challenges. 6 
With the Canadian situation established, the 
motives and aims of those who administered the 
22 
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patrolling policy can now be discussed. A general 
overview of the policy's implementation is useful 
in highlighting these. 
On 17 May the Brigade Major of 25 CIB, 
Major J.C. Allan, drafted an instruction which 
stated: "With effect 18 May 52 battalions will 
carry out at least one strong fighting patrol each 
per week, with the aim of establishing contact 
with the enemy. "7 No mention of prisoners was 
made in this instruction. Two weeks later, 
another instruction was issued to the Canadian 
battalions by Allan on 3 June clarifying that the 
purpose of fighting patrols during the latter half 
of May had been to "establish contact with the 
enemy and obtain maximum reaction" and he 
concluded that this had been accomplished. 8 He 
went on to say that, effective immediately and 
until further notice, fighting patrols could be 
discontinued while ambush, reconnaissance and 
standing patrols would be kept up. However, on 
11 June, a conference held at 1 Comwel Div 
noted, under the heading "Raids to capture PW," 
that prisoners were required and that all 
divisions were instructed to carry out raids up 
to company strength. 9 The war diarist of the 
Canadian brigade confirms this and wrote on 
the same day that the brigade had again been 
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requested to take "aggressive action" in its 
patrolling policy in order to capture a prisoner 
every six days. 10 Even as late as 21 June, the 
Canadian brigade's war diarist commented that 
orders had come from the division commander 
emphasizing the need to capture prisoners. 11 It 
seems clear that the stated aim of the patrolling 
policy through May and June, continued to be 
the capture of prisoners. However, the 
Commonwealth Division Commander, Major-
General Cassels, writing in the division's periodic 
report, challenged the wisdom of insisting on 
such a restrictive policy: 
.. .I am being harassed and ordered by Corps to 
produce a prisoner every third day, apparently 
regardless of cost. As we know quite well what 
enemy divisions are in front of us I cannot see 
the point in this and have said so and have asked 
if there is any special reason behind the request 
[for prisoners] ... Personally I believe the reason 
behind the order was to keep the U.S. Army 
divisions "sharp" regardless of casualties, and 
at least one of their divisions had taken very 
considerable casualties -between 2,000 and 
3,000. The Commander of lst U.S. Marine 
Division .. .is in complete agreement with my 
views. 12 
The Canadian Brigade Commander, Brigadier 
Bogert, echoed this sentiment by attempting to 
scale down the patrolling operations on 3 June 
after May's patrols had suffered 52 casualties, 
of which nine were fatal, but failed to bring back 
a single prisoner. 13 
If Cassels was right about the American 
motive behind the patrolling policy, did the 
capturing of prisoners have any merit on its own? 
The most surprising answer originates with 1 
US Corps Periodic Intelligence Report dated 20 
June 1952. The author of the report had 
conducted a comparison of Prisoner of War (PW) 
reports for April 1951 and 1952. He found that 
while the prisoners captured in 1951 were well-
informed concerning their own and adjacent unit 
positions, recent PW's possessed no information 
of value. 14 Considering that a good number of 
"agents" and deserters were proving to be a good 
source of intelligence, it seems remarkable that 
Corps HQ would continue to give the capture of 
PWs such a high priority. 15 
This suggests that the policy was designed 
from the start not as an intelligence-gathering 
vehicle, but rather as a way to keep front-line 
units in fighting trim. But, despite the 
Lieutenant Paul Ranger checks Private Jean-Guy 
Lacroix's wireless set as he prepares for a night 
patrol. Note the soft shoes, dark clothing and black 
face make-up. 14 June 1952. 
(Photo by George Whittaker, NAC PA 136788 
disillusionment felt by those commanders 
responsible for its execution, Canadian soldiers 
were to mount no less than 1,033 patrols of all 
types during this period. 16 
The majority of these were static standing 
patrols, that is, routine three- to five-man patrols 
better described as early warning listening posts 
or perimeter security, the latter to monitor gaps 
in wire and minefields to facilitate the mounting 
of other patrols. Major W.H. Pope, who served 
with 1 R22eR as a company commander, drafted 
a paper entitled "Infantry Patrolling in Korea" in 
1953. In it he disputed the value of these 
outposts because they were static, known to the 
enemy and therefore ineffective as early 
warning. 17 
Another type, the ambush patrol, was 
criticized by Pope for being sent out whether or 
not any signs of the enemy had been reported 
and therefore went out as per a schedule "to 
places where it would be most convenient for us 
for the enemy to pass. "18 This is borne out by 
23 
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the fact that of 25 ambushes mounted by the 
RCRs in June only five were laid beyond the river 
on the enemy side of the valley. 19 Altogether, 43 
of these patrols were mounted by the Canadians 
in May and June and none succeeded in 
ambushing the enemy. Of note, however, was an 
ambush patrol, led by Corporal Presley of "D" 
Company, 1 RCR, which interrupted an enemy 
ambush patrol of platoon strength as it deployed 
some 300 metres south of "D" Company's 
defensive position. 
Presley's patrol had been returning to its 
lines when one of its members spotted an enemy 
soldier and opened fire on him. Because the 
Chinese were in the process of laying their 
ambush, the RCRs managed to extricate 
themselves and re-enter their lines but not before 
Presley had been mortally wounded. It was later 
determined that the Chinese had planned their 
ambush well with the main part of their force in 
extended line across the reentrant south of"D" 
Company and a fire base on Point 101 some 300 
metres to the southeast. Intelligence garnered 
from the body of an enemy soldier killed by 
Presley's patrol identified the soldier as being 
part of a security unit, suggesting that the 
Chinese had employed specialist troops in what 
was likely an attempt to capture a PW. 20 
Some eight or nine "Jitter" patrols, an RCR 
creation, were also carried out. This unorthodox 
patrol of roughly 12 men attempted to bait the 
enemy into reacting to its fire which purportedly 
simulated a Canadian attack. Jitter patrols were 
designed to move up to the enemy position and 
open fire before withdrawing several hundred 
metres to lay an ambush. The aim was to tempt 
the enemy into either revealing his position so 
that artillery fire could be brought to bear, or to 
entice him to advance into a hasty ambush. In 
the first case, the effects of bombardment were 
likely negligible and difficult to verify given the 
nature of the Chinese positions. In the second 
instance, the problem lay in persuading the 
Chinese that an attack was underway and that 
the Canadians could be successfully 
counterattacked. However, jitter patrols rarely 
went beyond the river21 and therefore must have 
appeared as rather unconvincing threats. At the 
same time, this type of patrol put itself at risk 
by inviting Chinese return fire on the patrol's 
relatively unprotected position on the valley floor. 
Brigadier Bogert nevertheless encouraged the use 
24 
of jitter patrols by other Canadian battalions. 22 
Jitter patrols never succeeded in ambushing the 
Chinese. Instead, an RCR jitter patrol, led by 
Lieutenant Goldie on the night of 28 May, 
suffered one killed and two wounded when it 
was surprised (or ambushed?) by an enemy 
patrol. 23 
The reconnaissance patrol, arguably the best 
intelligence gathering patrol of all, was not well 
represented during this period. Designed to 
observe the enemy (ideally without making 
contact), it generally comprised less than three 
soldiers. One might assume therefore that the 
RCR patrolling operations would have gained 
much from their employment. Although it is 
possible that other patrols may have had 
reconnaissance tasks, only three reconnaissance 
patrols were recorded by the RCRs in May and 
June, and none were part of a preparation for 
impending offensive action. 24 The author of 
Strange Battleground, Herbert Wood, points out 
that "this must have made the planning of fighting 
or ... ambush patrols very difficult. 25 
Despite the lack of reconnaissance, the 
Canadian brigade conducted 20 fighting patrols 
in the month of May alone. These fighting patrols, 
or raids as they were often called, appear to have 
been the best candidate for the capture of 
prisoners. Most were parties of 20-30 men. A 
detailed study of two RCR fighting patrols, a 
platoon-sized one in May and a company raid in 
June, will serve to highlight the shortcomings of 
these patrols and explain why they were unable 
to bring back a PW. 
Six fighting patrols, dispatched by 1 RCR in 
the first three weeks of May, had failed to capture 
prisoners while suffering a total of seven 
wounded and one missing. 26 The quick and 
effective Chinese reaction to the presence of 
patrols near their positions prevented the 
Canadians from getting in close enough to grab 
a captive. However, Brigadier Bogert had learned 
that the Chinese retired deep into their bunker 
systems during UN air strikes, and reasoned that 
"a timely air strike at dusk followed by additional 
supporting fire would enable a patrol to reach 
its objective before the Chinese could offer a 
response. "27 With this in mind he ordered 
Colonel Bingham, commanding officer of 1 RCR, 
to conduct a raid on Pt. 113 (see Map 2). 
Lieutenant Peterson and 22 others of "A" 
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Map 2- Chinch'on, 31 May 1952 
Company were assigned the task. While 
Peterson's group rehearsed its mission, an 
extensive fire plan was drawn up. Along with 
fighter-bombers and their 1,000-pound bombs, 
the plan included artillery, mortar, machine gun 
and even light antiaircraft gun fire. 28 Given that 
the airstrike had to take place during daylight if 
it was to be on target, and that the RCR patrol 
could not leave its lines without the cover of 
darkness, the patrol would have to make its way 
to the objective as quickly as possible after the 
bombing run was completed. With the details 
worked out, the date was set for the end of the 
month. 
Overcast skies and a quarter moon made the 
last evening of May ideal. Thirteen minutes after 
the completion of the airstrtke, the patrol left its 
lines and had crossed the river by 2030 hours. 
Near the village of Chinch'on, the patrol 
commander called down the artillery as planned 
and moved his patrol up to the first line of 
communication trenches which were found 
abandoned and in disrepair. Leaving behind a 
"firm base," the remainder of the patrol moved 
up the draw on the north slope of Hill 113 while 
indirect and direct fire support continued on a 
timed program. The patrol found the second line 
of trenches to be similarly deserted, but the 
second-in-command, Corporal Stinson, and six 
men were left to search the bunkers while 
Peterson and seven others proceeded to the 
trenches atop the hill. 29 
As Stinson's group cleared bunkers with 
shouts of"Chu-la" ("come out" in Chinese) and 
phosphorous grenades, a soldier appeared and 
was taken prisoner. However, when an enemy 
section counterattacked from Hill 115 three 
Canadians were wounded, including the man 
guarding the prisoner. The Chinese soldier tried 
to escape but was shot by the injured guard and 
the dead man's body was searched before 
Stinson's men began to fight their way back to 
the firm base. 30 
Meanwhile, the patrol leader's group had 
been clearing trenches and bunkers as they 
moved west along the crest. Although Peterson 
had spotted an enemy soldier moving below him 
in a tunnel, his men were unable to take a 
prisoner before the firefight between Stinson's 
men and the counterattacking Chinese prompted 
him to withdraw to the firm base. After 
reorganizing his patrol near the village, Peterson 
25 
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moved his troops back to the river under steady 
fire from the Chinese. By 2316 hours the patrol 
had returned to its own lines carrying the two 
more seriously wounded of their four 
casualties.31 
Later, Lieutenant Peterson would receive the 
Military Cross, and Corporal Stinson, the 
Military Medal for their actions in what Major-
General Cassels called "a specially daring raid 
against a strong enemy position. "32 Touted as a 
success by the diarist ofthe Canadian brigade,33 
an evaluation reiterated by the author of"A Patrol 
in Korea, "34 the patrol's outcome nevertheless 
raised many questions. For example, to the 
patrol's astonishment, they could find no enemy 
dead to testifY to the effectiveness of an enormous 
amount of friendly supporting fire. Instead, the 
patrol commander noted that the enemy had 
recovered rapidly from the intense air and 
artillery bombardment and appeared from 
bunkers and foxholes in all directions. Stinson's 
group was also struck by the determination of 
the enemy counterattack which took place under 
UN machine gun, mortar and artillery fire and 
eventually came close enough to engage his group 
with grenades. In addition, the use of fighter 
bombers, which temporarily neutralized the 
enemy hill, forced the patrol to move faster than 
a patrol would normally do. The patrol covered 
some 900 metres to the river in nine minutes 
and thereby exposed itself to enemy ambush. 
Therefore, the preponderance of supporting fire 
allotted the patrol failed to prevent a rapid enemy 
reaction against it and denied its commander 
sufficient flexibility as a result of the elaborately 
timed fire plan. 
As for the effects taken from the short-lived 
captive during one of the most successful fighting 
patrols, they contained little of military value 
except to prove that a Chinese private was better 
equipped than presupposed. 35 Ultimately, as 
Woods reminds his readers, the patrol had failed 
in its objective- to capture a prisoner. 
Thereafter aggressive patrolling along the 
Canadian front declined in intensity until, in the 
later half of June, pressure from divisional 
headquarters prompted a series of larger raids 
conducted by each of the Canadian battalions. 
On the night of 22 June the RCR effort, a 
26 
company-sized patrol, was carried out by "C" 
Company on Hill 113 (see Map 3). 
Codenamed "Beaverdam" and led by the 
officer commanding "C" Company, Major 
Holmes, the operation's intent was to take and 
hold Hill 113 for not less than an hour to 
facilitate a thorough search of the position and 
the capture ofPWs. Intelligence estimates placed 
an enemy section and medium machine gun on 
Point 115, a platoon on 113, a section on the 
ridge around Point 72 with another two sections 
on Hill 75. The company was organized into 
three elements: an assault platoon, a mop-up 
platoon and company headquarters (Coy HQ), 
and a reserve platoon. Once again the patrol was 
planned in detail, incorporating an elaborate fire 
plan of artillery, mortar, tank and machine-gun 
fire, a reconnaissance from forward observation 
posts and rehearsals in rear areas.36 
At 2327 hours the assault platoon left by 
way of the "A" Company south "gate" followed by 
the remainder of the patrol with the reserve 
platoon departing an hour later. The patrol 
travelled south and then northwest to the river 
in three groups. At about 0200 hours and 
approximately 150 metres east of the abandoned 
village of Chinch'on the assault platoon took fire 
in the form of four or five rifle shots. This platoon 
continued to advance, cutting across the track 
at the northeast end of the settlement and 
proceeding up the draw between Points 113 and 
115. Meanwhile the fire plan had been initiated 
by Major Holmes at 0205 hours and with this 
covering fire the second group moved up to the 
base of Hill 113. About the time the first group 
reached the middle line of Chinese crawl 
trenches, three large explosions (later thought 
to be an ad hoc antipersonnel device detonated 
manually by the enemy) occurred at brief regular 
intervals amongst Coy HQ and the mop-up 
platoon, wounding three men. Shortly afterward 
four men of the assault platoon, having reached 
the crest around 0220 hours, entered enemy 
bunkers. The situation became critical almost 
immediately as the platoon was exposed to 
grenades, automatic weapon and light machine 
gun fire which resulted in the three section 
commanders and the platoon signaller becoming 
casualties, in addition to two of those already 
on the Chinese position. With five wounded and 
one killed the platoon withdrew to the second 
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Map 3- Chinch'on, 22 June 1952 
line of trenches where it reorganized before 
moving down to the base ofthe hill. About 0300 
hours the company began to move back under 
automatic small arms and accurate mortar fire. 
Despite the smoke that filled the valley the patrol 
continued to suffer casualties as it returned by 
way of the north gate of "A" Company's position 
as Chinese mortar fire shifted onto the RCR 
defensive positions and inflicted still more 
casualties before dawn.37 
RCR battle casualties for June were five 
killed and 39 wounded. Operation "Beaverdam" 
cost 29 casualties, including one fatality, in the 
span of three hours. 38 To put this in perspective, 
a Patricia patrol the night before had fared even 
worse, suffering six killed and 18 wounded in a 
raid on Hill 133 near Pukch'ang. The Vandoos 
met with similar resistance on the night of 23 
June and lost one killed, five wounded and two 
missing in another fighting patrol. In no cases 
were prisoners taken. 39 
With respect to the RCR patrol, its problems 
began early with its compromise near the river; 
by the time the patrol was within striking 
distance of the Chinese positions, the enemy had 
been alerted. The disruption of command and 
control by explosions amidst the mop-up platoon 
and Coy HQ left the assault platoon temporarily 
on its own and made it difficult to co-ordinate 
support from the reserve platoon, which in any 
case was too far back to provide immediate 
assistance to those on top of the feature. Similar 
explosions had contributed to the toll of 24 
casualties suffered by the Patricia's 35 man 
patrol the night before, but had yet to be 
investigated when "C" Company set off for its 
raid on Hill 113. Finally as Major Holmes 
explained in an interview: "The wounding of three 
key men ... at the crucial point of success, where 
so much depends on the junior leader, is 
considered the prime factor which cheated the 
company of victory. "40 This aside, "C" Company 
had relied, like Peterson's patrol at the end of 
May, upon overwhelming fire support rather than 
stealth and surprise. This had once again proven 
ineffective, and inappropriate given the 
operational situation. 
Given what has been shown of RCR 
patrolling operations, it is important to consider 
Major Pope's allegation that there was a "sit-tight 
mentality" pervasive among UN commanders in 
27 
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Korea which contributed to a "defeatist" spirit among their 
soldiers or that "many Majors and Lieutenant -Colonels with 
WW II experience were most concerned not to get 
themselves killed in a side show like Korea. "41 The evidence 
in the Canadian example does not support his first 
contention while the second is conjecture and difficult to 
prove either way. Although many commanders were 
reluctant to risk their subordinates' lives for unclear aims, 
they nevertheless attempted, perhaps at times 
overcautiously, to prosecute the war by taking the fight to 
the enemy, as more than 20 raids by the Canadian brigade 
in May and June attest. The failure of the raids had less to 
do with hesitation on the part of commanders than with 
other factors. 
28 
OPERATION "BEAVERDAM"- Before 
Top left: The OC of "C" Company, Major 
Don Holmes (seated, centre), reviews air 
photos with his officers and senior NCOs 
before setting out on the night's fighting 
patrol. Major Holmes had enlisted in the 
ranks in 1940 and was commissioned 
two years later. 1 n 1944 he served as a 
CANLOAN officer with 6th British 
Airborne Division. Left to right are 2nd 
Lt. G. Ritchie, Sgt. J. Mazerolle, W02 J. 
Doran, Sgt. G. Macpherson, Lt. E. Bauld, 
Maj. Holmes, Sgt. Desroches and Sgt. 
B. Robinson. 
(Photo by P. Tomelin, NAC PA 129739) 
Top right: Sergeant Don Desroches of 8 
Platoon, "C" Company, combines his 
study of an air photo with his meal 
during preparation for Operation 
"Beaverdam." He carries Thompson 
submachine gun ammunition in his 
bandolier. 
(Photo by G. Whittaker, NAC PA 151744) 
Bottom left: Major Holmes checks 
Private H.J. Norris' equipment. Because 
radio communications often failed, 
Operation "Beaverdam" planned to use 
field telephones to maintain contact with 
HQ and the battalion's fire control 
centre. Note the spools of wire carried 
by Privates Norris and Drinkwater. 
(Photo by P. Tomelin, NAC PA 129740) 
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OPERATION "BEAVERDAM" - After 
Top left: Private H.A. Schreyer, one of 
the more seriously wounded during the 
"C" Company raid, is evacuated to a 
field hospital in an American helicopter. 
(Photo by P. Tomelin, NAC PA 131723) 
Top right: Privates Thomas Ridgeway, 
John Gandy and Jim Graham (left to 
right) fired some 8,000 rounds of 
ammunition over a two-hour period 
while providing fire support with their 
Vickers machine gun during Operation 
"Beaverdam." Note the empty cartridge 
cases under the gun and the used belts 
behind Private Graham. 
(Photo by P. Tomelin, NAC PA 131762) 
Bottom left: Lieutenent E.G. Bauld 
(with jump smock and sidearm) stands 
outside the Regimental Aid Post on the 
morning of 22 June with some of his 
men. He was slightly wounded leading 
the assault platoon which suffered the 
operation's only fatality. Private A.J. 
Gosselin. 
(NAC PA 192639) 
A sounder argument would be that UN 
commanders failed to appreciate the operational 
and tactical situations in deciding upon the 
patrolling policy and its emphasis on the capture 
of prisoners. While this certainly appears to be 
true, Canadian brigade and battalion 
commanders were likewise negligent in their 
appreciation of the situation. And, for this 
reason, a substantial part of the blame for the 
policy's failure rests with those who were 
responsible for the policy's execution. 
This is borne out, in part, by the tendency of 
Canadian commanders to manage patrols as set-
piece miniature battles, as was the case with the 
two RCR patrols studied. It was this mind set, 
rather than the sit-tight mentality espoused by 
Pope, that commanders were guilty of 
harbouring. They de-emphasised the importance 
of stealth and surprise - key elements in the 
success of Canadian trench raids in the First 
World War, 42 in favour of a methodical approach 
29 
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which relied on a preponderance of firepower to 
fight their patrols onto enemy positions. They 
also underestimated the enemy, both in his 
ability to weather fierce bombardment and to 
strike back at Canadian patrols. Patrolling, as 
will be seen, was not a phase of war in its own 
right, but merely an extension of offensive or 
defensive operations. Commanders, still in the 
process of coming to terms with the 
fundamentals of patrolling operations, were 
handicapped by a certain amount of 
complacency with the tried and true tactics of 
an offensive and defensive doctrine developed 
over two world wars. This naturally meant that 
planning, preparation, and training were shaped 
by patterns that did not necessarily fit the 
requirements of patrolling. 
In 1943 the Canadian army had faced a 
similar challenge during the Italian winter as an 
RCR officer relates: 
The war bogged down and became a replica of 
the early months of World War I...[and] life for 
the infantry was one long round of 
reconnaissance or fighting patrols. The RCR 
provided 64 of these patrols ... The Germans were 
good watchers. They rarely patrolled forward of 
their own lines, other than to establish ambush 
patrols on our likely routes into their territory. 
Night after night Canadian patrols walked into a 
line of fire, or got caught in a mortar 
concentration. They never seemed to accomplish 
anything ... 43 
The frustration felt by Strome Galloway was 
undoubtedly shared by those of his regiment who 
later served in Korea, as there is little in 1952 to 
suggest that the RCRs had profited much by their 
patrolling experience in World War Two. What 
appears more likely is that no-man's-land was 
dominated by the Chinese, as Pope alleged, and 
not by the Canadians, as Bogert claimed. 44 
Galloway's disenchantment with patrolling 
was likely the result of what Pope warned would 
occur if patrols did not have a clearly defined 
purpose. Morale, he said, suffered when 
patrolling became routine, often having nothing 
to report (NTR). Many of the patrols conducted 
by 1 RCR in the spring of 1952 were NTRs, and 
almost every contact with the enemy resulted in 
Canadian casualties.45 Therefore, the 1 RCR 
patrolling plan itself was flawed because it lacked 
a motive force as the unlikelihood of capturing 
prisoners became evident, and because for the 
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majority of patrols the taking of prisoners was 
never a serious consideration. 
However, there is little doubt that the 
prisoner issue dominated to the detriment of the 
patrolling agenda. A report prepared by the 
British 28th Infantry Brigade in April 1953 
stresses the importance of thorough 
reconnaissance in the planning of patrols, 
although it neglects to stress the use of 
reconnaissance patrols in this capacity. It is 
careful to point out instead that "the need for 
prisoners is so great that the primary task of 
reconnaissance may be sacrificed if the 
opportunity to take a prisoner presents itself. "46 
This preoccupation with prisoners is only part 
of a wider problem, the relegation of 
reconnaissance to that of secondary importance 
in the preparation of patrols. 
The few reconnaissance patrols listed on the 
Canadian brigade's patrol task table, 47 suggest 
that reconnaissance beyond forward defended 
localities was not required for the preparation 
of patrols. It may also have been thought that 
the lightly-manned reconnaissance patrol was 
too vulnerable on the battlefield, commanders 
opting instead to reconnoitre in force with 
fighting patrols. In any case, most Canadian 
commanders disregarded the importance of this 
type of patrol. Pope, on the other hand was 
adamant and insisted that "lay-up recce patrols 
[are] ... a prerequisite of any raid. "48 Pope's 
argument merits serious attention because of a 
successful "snatch" patrol carried out by 1 RCR 
in September 1952. In Pope's words it was: 
... a classic example of how to kidnap a 
Chinaman. This seven-man patrol was a success 
because of its preparation (a deep lay-up recce 
inside enemy lines carried out by the leader of 
the snatch), its originality, its stealth, and finally 
its audacity. Most regrettably, this operation-
our only success - has not been allowed to 
become a model for the Brigade.49 
Major Pope had written his commentary a year 
after 1 RCRs first stint in the line and his views 
continued to meet with opposition. The reason 
stems from the intractability of commanders 
addressed previously, but it also arose for want 
of a definitive patrol doctrine within the 
Commonwealth Division as a whole. 
The British army manual published in 
January 1952 devotes only a few lines to the 
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topic of patrolling as part of battalion operations 
wherein the role of patrols is to watch the enemy, 
drive off enemy patrols and attempt to gain 
enemy identifications.50 Such a passive and 
defensive-minded outlook suggests that 
patrolling's significance amounted to little more 
than front-line housekeeping. However, what 
Commonwealth troops were called upon to do 
required more than just keeping no-man's-land 
tidy. The Canadians, armed with British 
operational doctrine, were therefore 
handicapped to a certain extent by the stagnation 
in the development of a patrolling doctrine which 
not only encouraged the carrying of the fight to 
the enemy, but provided the means to accomplish 
it. 
To be more specific, the experiences of World 
War Two had given rise to the creation of the 
scout platoon within some Canadian infantry 
battalions. A scout section had already existed 
as part of the battalion establishment but it was 
primarily a sniper section that was double-hatted 
to provide limited reconnaissance capability. A 
platoon formed in Sicily by the PPCLI during 
1943 was an ad hoc sub-unit which had no 
status in any army organization and did not exist 
as a legal entity on paper, while its troops 
(unwanted trouble-makers) and equipment were 
scrounged from rifle companies. The platoon was 
tasked to reconnoitre ahead and on the flanks 
of the battalion. This included acting as guides, 
mounting fighting patrols and capturing 
prisoners, although it functioned, in the main, 
as a reconnaissance patrol of platoon size. 5 1 By 
war's end it had been disbanded with only the 
sniper section remaining on the battalion order 
of battle. The value of the experiment has not 
been established but it remained to apply the 
same logic of reconnoitring in support of an 
infantry battalion's operations to that of 
patrolling operations. 
In Korea, the scout section of Canadian infantry 
battalions was employed piecemeal, a single 
scout often augmenting a patrol as its point 
man. 52 The scout section does not appear to have 
carried out patrols as a group and its expertise 
in reconnaissance went untested. Pope's 
insistence that no raid be attempted until the 
enemy's position both by day and night and from 
the front and the rear had been reconnoitred is 
sensible. The use of scouts for this task appears 
equally logical. Had Canadian commanders 
Lieutenant H.R. Gardner (with Thompson 
submachine gun) and Corporal Karl E. Fowler of 1 
RCR were awarded the Military Cross and the 
Military Medal respectively for a patrol they mounted 
on 23 I 24 September 1952 that led to the capture of 
a Chinese prisoner. In preparation for their "snatch," 
the two men, along with three other soldiers, had 
mounted a "lay-up" patrol near a Chinese field 
kitchen, where they spent 60 long and cold hours 
noting the enemy's routine. 
(Photo by George Whittaker, NAC PA 151744) 
chosen to employ their scouts in this manner 
they would have realized that what doubled as 
the battalion's snipers were too few in number. 
Commanders were therefore forced to rely on 
the soldiers in their rifle companies to perform 
some patrol tasks for which they were poorly 
trained and which would become a specialist's 
forte by the end of the 1950s. 
In sum, Canadian commanders were guilty 
of using inappropriate patrol tactics, of generally 
allowing patrols to become routine and 
meaningless, and primarily, of inadequate 
reconnaissance. All these failings can be linked 
to the absence of an effective patrol doctrine. 
Although it is less clear from an examination 
of patrol reports, a general lack of training 
contributed to the lacklustre performance of 
Canadian patrols. There is evidence to suggest 
that the problem, for the RCRs at least, began in 
Canada. Like 1 PPCLI and 1 R22eR, 1 RCR had 
been required to leave behind 287 parachutists 
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as the Cold War began to make other demands 
on the Canadian Army. An army telegram dated 
14 February 1952 lamented that the trained 
manpower situation was such that "every attempt 
must be made to effect economy and not dispatch 
one more than necessary to the Far East. 53 
Consequently, these units remained 
undermanned until, in the last months before 
they deployed to Korea, the battalions were filled 
out with drafts. One cannot help but wonder at 
how effectively these latecomers could have been 
trained before they embarked for Korea despite 
Wood's assertion that the training, in the rifle 
companies at least, had reached a high standard 
in a short space oftime. 54 Indeed, there are many 
examples in Korea that suggest that this was not 
the case. 
Those whom Pope referred to disparagingly 
as "our one-year soldiers" were chastised for 
their "deplorable lack of first aid training," their 
unprofessional operation of wireless sets, and 
their negligent use of firearms causing three 
people to be shot due to carelessness during 1 
RCRs first month on the line. 55 More training 
deficiencies were uncovered by the commander 
of a two-week patrol course run by the Patricias 
at about the same time. He noted that the 
members ofPPCLI rifle companies who attended 
the training did not have "sufficient basic 
knowledge of [wireless] procedure, map using 
and compass work. "56 Also noted were problems 
in carrying out night work, especially night firing, 
and fire control. 57 
The fact that a patrol course was run "in 
house" suggests that the Patricias, at least, 
recognized a need for better training in patrolling. 
The Canadian brigade likewise saw a need for 
improvement in a number of areas and therefore 
ran an assortment of courses such as a Junior 
Leaders Course, a Nuclear, Chemical and 
Biological Warfare Course and many more 
including what must have been a much sought 
after Water Duties Course!58 It is therefore 
difficult to understand why the brigade did not 
accord patrol training a priority at all. Not until 
Brigadier Allard took over in the spring of 1953 
was a brigade patrol school set up under the 
auspices of its champion Major Pope, who had 
opted to stay in Korea for a second tour. 59 
Unfortunately the patrol school had begun 
just as the Korean War neared its end and to 
32 
Pope's chagrin the training never had an 
opportunity to be evaluated. 60 On a positive note, 
Pope's complaint that his brigade had not 
modelled its patrolling tactics on that of the 
successful RCR patrol in September 1952, 
proved to be inaccurate as the increase in the 
number of reconnaissance patrols in 1953 
demonstrates. Moreover, the patrol orders for 
these missions carefully stated the aim of each 
as providing information on enemy positions 
with a view to later offensive action, something 
which should have pleased Pope. 61 
From the start, there were gaps in the 
training of Canadian soldiers for Korea. Once in 
theatre an interim training plan attempted to 
remedy deficiencies. It was to take some time, 
however, for the more pressing training needs of 
infantry patrolling to be addressed, and then only 
after Canada had rotated a third, relatively 
unseasoned, group of infantrymen to the Far East 
in 1953. But, it must be realized that in order 
for training of this nature to take place patrolling 
had to be recognized for what was, and still is, a 
most effective means of maintaining the initiative, 
particularly when conducting a withdrawal or 
defensive operations. 
The HQ 1 US Corps directive could have been 
more effective had it not made the capture of 
PWs a priority, to the detriment of patrolling's 
broader function. However, the patrolling policy 
may have failed in any case due to its dependence 
on commanders who were not able to appreciate 
the unique nature of patrolling and, therefore, 
plan and prepare their operations accordingly. 
Finally, successful patrolling ultimately relies on 
the expertise and resourcefulness of those who 
carry out the mission. Canada's soldiers, lacking 
the former, were required to exercise the latter, 
a characteristically Canadian substitute for 
proper training which inevitably produces 
indeterminate results. 
In Korea a nascent Canadian patrol doctrine 
was attempting to temper American enthusiasm 
for offensive action with British caution. The 
formula continued to be refmed and the evolution 
of Canadian patrolling witnessed the 
development of the reconnaissance platoon as 
the newest member of the battalion support 
company. In 1958 the first infantry 
reconnaissance course was held. One of its 
instructors was none other than Major W.H. 
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Pope. 62 How much the experiences of Korea 
played in this development has yet to be studied, 
but certainly it must have been a combination 
of Canada's experience during three very 
different wars, beginning with the Great War in 
1914. 
After a particularly successful company raid 
by his battalion in September 1951, the 
Commanding Officer of 2 RCR, Lieutenant-
Colonel Keane, had boasted: 
It is once again established. as in general here 
in Korea, that there are no new lessons ... Our 
experiences by night have led us to conclude that 
the Canadian soldier with his adaptability, 
initiative and native cunning is far superior to 
the Chinese by night- or by day. 63 
In many ways Keane was right. Canadian 
soldiers in Korea did not have to learn any new 
lessons, but merely had to rediscover humility 
whilst relearning some old drills. 
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